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Scope of the Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction:
Historical Basis
Although the judicial and legislative branches of our
government are considered separate, Congress has certain
powers over the Supreme Court. One of these is the
power to regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction; this
Article explores the derivation and extent of that power.
After an analysis of the Constitutional Convention of
1787 and of the attitudes of its delegates, the author
concludes that this power was intended to be limited to
regulating the treatment of fact issues and not issues
of law.
Henry J. Merry*
The power of Congress over the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is one element of constitutional law that would
seem to have been settled early in the history of the two institu-
tions but, actually, few constitutional problems are more funda-
mentally unsolved. Strangely enough, this lack of resolution is due
to the long standing mutual indulgence of what have often been
pictured as bitter enemies. On the one hand, beginning with the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has always recognized that the
Supreme Court has substantial appellate power;' on the other
hand, since 1796 the Supreme Court has repeatedly gone beyond
strict judicial needs to declare that its appellate jurisdiction de-
pends upon statutory enactment.2 The limitations that Congress
* Assistant Professor of Government, Purdue University.
1. For example, Congress has always provided that the Supreme Court
may re-examine and reverse or affirm the final judgment or decree of the
highest court of a state when there is a question of repugnance of state
law to the United States Constitution, and state law is upheld. Rnv. STAT.
§§ 690, 709 (1875); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958).1 2. See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796), discussed in
text accompanying note 61 infra. In Colorado Cent. Consol. Mining Co. v.
Turck, 150 U.S. 138, 141 (1893), the Supreme Court declared that "an
uninterrupted series of decisions" has held that "this court exercises ap-
pellate jurisdiction only in accordance with the acts of Congress upon that
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has imposed have not presented a real test of its power with respect
to the Court's essential functions.3 But a disturbing factor is the
thought implicit in the remarks of the Court that it is not sub-
stantially independent, as those who revere a government of laws
believe that it should be.4 The danger is not simply hypothetical.
Congress has often been urged to curb the Court by curtailing its
appellate jurisdiction,' and these attacks on the Court may have
been caused in part by the uncertainties or overstatements of the
scope of congressional authority.
The problem has both inherent and circumstantial difficulties.
It is basically a matter of determining how much appellate juris-
diction is derived directly from the Constitution and how much is
dependent upon congressional acknowledgment, and such indicia
as are implicit in the constitutional language have long been re-
versed in the structure of congressional enactments as well as in
the remarks of the Supreme Court. Even though the Constitution
says that the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction and gives
Congress only the secondary role of making exceptions and regula-
tions,' the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its successors have not set
subject." In Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943), the Court
said that its appellate jurisdiction is "defined by statute."
3. See notes 11 & 16 infra.
4. See Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960).
5. See Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MODERN L.
REv. 345 (1958).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
The authorization of Congress in this clause may be contrasted with that
on the establishment of inferior courts. Congress has full discretion over
whether inferior courts may even exist, but the Constitution provides that
the Supreme Court shall exist and that it shall have appellate jurisdiction.
With respect to inferior courts, congressional authority is full and precedent,
whereas with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, congressional
power is limited in scope and subsequent or secondary in character. Chief
Justice Marshall declared in one opinion that the appellate powers of the
Supreme Court "are given by the constitution." Durousseau v. United
States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810); accord, Ex parte McCardle.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1868). The opinion in Daniels v. Railroad
Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250 (1865), says that the Constitution defines the
power to receive appellate jurisdiction, and that within this capacity, Con-
gress may determine how far jurisdiction is to be given and exercised. This
reverses the emphasis in the constitutional language, but the reversal of
emphasis was not essential to the decision. The Daniels case involved a
statute providing that if the circuit court justices are evenly divided, review
is limited to issues of law. Such a statute is peripheral or procedural in
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forth exceptions, but rather have defined the types of cases in
which the Court may act.7 This may be interpreted as making ex-
ceptions by implication,' but the impression is that Congress is the
source of the Court's jurisdiction.9 This impression has been for-
tified by the repeated assertions of the Supreme Court that it can
exercise appellate jurisdiction only in accordance with acts of
Congress.1" These statements contain an element of obiter dic-
tum, 1 but removing the overstatement has only a neutralizing ef-
character and can appropriately be regarded as secondary or subordinate
to the primary principle that the Supreme Court has substantial and essential
appellate jurisdiction.
7. For example, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that "the Supreme
Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts
of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for ......
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 81 (1789). This method of
enactment or style of presentation would be clearly proper on the jurisdic-
tion of the inferior courts, and the same style may have been used through-
out the act for purposes of uniformity. The act also specified in the same
manner the types of cases within the original jurisdiction of the Court even
though this jurisdiction is unquestionably derived directly from the Con-
stitution.
8. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S.(6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810), said:
They [Congress] have not, indeed, made these exceptions in express
terms. They have not declared that the appellate power of the court
shall not extend to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively
its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has been understood to
imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not
comprehended within it.
9. In fact, one leading authority even approves the statement that "the
Constitution specifically grants to Congress the power to determine the
Court's appellate jurisdiction." PnrrcHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME
COURT, 1957-60, at 122 (1961). Some commentators make the nominal
distinction that while "strictly speaking" the Constitution confers appellatejurisdiction, such jurisdiction is as a practical matter statutory. ROBERTSON
& KuAm, JuRIsmcnoN OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2 (2d ed. 1951). See also Lenoir, Congressional Control Over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 5 KAN. L. REv. 16 (1956). This article
cites the limits imposed by United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128
(1872), which held invalid a Congressional enactment laying down a "rule
of decision" on proof of loyalty in certain post-Civil War situations. This,
however, was less an attempt to deny jurisdiction than an effort to control
substantive determination.
10. For instance, in Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796),
the Court said: "If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceed-
ings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is pro-
vided, we cannot depart from it." This case and statement are discussed in
note 59 infra and accompanying text. In St. Louis & I.M. Ry. v. Taylor,
210 U.S. 281 (1908), the Court declared that it exercises appellate jurisdic-
tion only in accordance with acts of Congress. In The Francis Wright, 105
U.S. 381, 386 (1881), the opinion goes so far as to say that "authority to
limit the jurisdiction necessarily carries with it authority to limit the use of
the jurisdiction."
11.
Many cases have dealt with statutory limitations upon the appellate
19621
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fect,' and the question of the extent of Congress' power re-
mains open.
Some attention has been given to the problem,'" and while
this has aided in clarifying the issue, it has not been particularly
satisfactory in arriving at a solution. The position that Congress
cannot completely deny appellate jurisdiction 4 is not very helpful
because it can be circumvented by a merely nominal grant." While
the doctrine that Congress cannot deny the Court "essential func-
tions"' 6 has a certain appeal, it seems to rest upon such indefinite
factors as the necessity of a supreme independent judiciary in a
federal union under law,' 7 the principle of balance of powers, 8
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. A few contain broad language re-
ferring to unlimited congressional control over that jurisdiction. But
none unequivocally holds that Congress has power to impair the
Court's essential constitutional functions. In every case the Court
either found no limitation on its jurisdiction or upheld a limitation
which did not impair those functions.
Ratner, supra note 4, at 173. In defining "essential functions," Professor
Ratner points out that the Supreme Court has regarded its indispensable
functions to be the establishment and maintenance of the uniformity and
supremacy of federal law. Id. at 166.
12. The fundamental principle that statements of a court have no binding
effect beyond the limits of the issue before the court at the time has been
asserted many times. E.g., Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States,
300 U.S. 98, 103 (1937); Northern Bank v. Porter Township Trustees, 110
U.S. 608, 615 (1884); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399
(1821). But this limitation upon binding effect does not give the statements
the contrary meaning that Congress lacks authority in this area; the limita-
tion merely neutralizes the opinions to the extent of the overstatement.
13. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 312-40 (1953); Lenoir, supra note 9; Ratner, supra note 4.
14. Chief Justice Marshall indicated in two opinions that if Congress did
not describe any jurisdiction, the Supreme Court would have full jurisdiction.
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 312-13 (1810);
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805).
15. HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 312.
16. "[Tlhe exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role
of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." HART & WECHSLER, op.
cit. supra note 13, at 312. The idea is further developed in Ratner, supra
note 4. A somewhat similar thought is expressed in COUNTRYMAN, THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 79-80 (1913), where it is con-
tended that the Court "cannot constitutionally be deprived of its appellate
jurisdiction in any novel or specially important branch of legal controversy."
The "essential functions" idea is distinct from the idea advanced by Mr.
Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816),
and not subsequently followed by the Court, that Congress is duty bound to
vest in the federal courts the whole judicial power described in the Constitu-
tion. That theory related to the power of the inferior courts and not to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
17. Ratner, supra note 4, at 166. On the importance of an independentjudiciary, see also St. Louis & I.M. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 293
(1908); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517 (1858); Dodge
v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 355 (1856); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380,415 (1821).
18. Ratner, supra note 4, at 173.
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and the general meaning of the terms "exceptions" and "regula-
tions."'19 A more specific ascertainment of how much authority
the Constitutional Convention intended to place in Congress is
needed. This article undertakes to analyze not only the meager
evidence in the available record of the Convention of 1787, but
also the relevant circumstances and the attitudes of the delegates
who were most concerned with the adoption of the constitutional
provision. It is hoped that such an analysis will throw some light
upon the purpose of the provision and in turn provide a means of
measurement.
I. THE CONVENTION OF 1787
The idea of giving Congress power to make exceptions and
regulations in respect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court originated, officially at least, in the five member Committee
of Detail,2" which met between July 26 and August 6, 1787, to
draft a proposed constitution on the basis of resolutions which had
been adopted during two months of debate on the original Ran-
dolph plan. The Committee was also to consider the Pinckney
plan, which had been submitted at the start of the Convention.
None of these resolutions or plans had suggested that Congress
was to have any power over the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.m Why the Committee brought forth this authorization of
congressional power must be ascertained largely from the circum-
stances and surrounding data because there is very little precise
information available on the proceedings in the Committee itself.2
There are fairly strong indications that the grant of congres-
19. Id. at 168-71.
20. The members of the Committee of Detail were John Rutledge (South
Carolina), Edmund Randolph (Virginia), Nathaniel Gorham (Massa-
chusetts), Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut), and James Wilson (Pennsyl-
vania).
21. In the records of the Convention, the Randolph and Pinckney plans
are usually presented under date of May 29, 1787, and the resolutions
referred to the Committee of Detail under date of July 26, 1787. The two
plans and the approved resolutions provided for appellate jurisdiction, but
only the Pinckney plan called for original jurisdiction. In this and in the
description of judicial power, the final constitutional provision is somewhat
more akin to the Pinckney plan than to the Randolph plan or the resolutions
derived from the latter.
22. 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL. CONVENTION 129-75
(1911) [hereinafter cited as FAm-AND], relates to the Committee of Detail.
This includes the plans submitted to the Committee, its report, and a few
other documents not particularly helpful in the matter under study.
I One document in the handwriting of Edmund Randolph provides that
the- jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be appellate only, except in
those instances in which the legislature shall make it original "and the
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sional power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was
related to the problem of the extent of the Court's review of is-
sues of fact as distinguished from those of law. While the provi-
sion reported by the Committee of Detail did not expressly say that
Congress was to have power to make exceptions and regulations
both as to law and fact,23 substantial grounds exist for concluding
that the Committee did struggle with the problem of fact issues.
Although much of the evidence is indirect, there is at least one
piece of rather direct support for this conclusion. When the provi-
sion reported by the Committee of Detail was being considered on
the floor of the Convention, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania
asked whether the appellate jurisdiction was to extend to matters of
fact as well as law and to cases of common law as well as civil
law.24 James Wilson, a member of the Committee of Detail, an-
legislature shall organize it." Id. at 147. This plan also provides that the
whole or a part of the jurisdiction prescribed for the supreme tribunal
may, in the discretion of the legislature, be assigned to the inferior tribunals
"as original tribunals." This looks upon the supreme tribunal primarily as
an appellate court. Another document in the handwriting of James Wilson
includes a provision on the judiciary that accords no discretion to the legis-
lature on jurisdiction generally, but gives the national legislature the ex-
clusive right of instituting in each state a court of admiralty for hearing
and determining maritime causes. Id. at 157. Elsewhere, there is an interest-
ing document found among the Mason papers but not in Mason's hand-
writing. This includes a plan under which appellate jurisdiction as to fact
would relate only to equity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and the
discretion of Congress on appellate jurisdiction would apply only to cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Id. at 433.
23. The relevant provision in the report of the Committee of Detail, fol-
lowing the sentence specifying the cases in which the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court would be original, states: "In all the other cases before
mentioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions, and under such regula-
tions, as the legislature shall make." 5 ELLIOT's DEBATES 380 (1866) [here-
inafter cited as ELLIOT]. A floor amendment on August 28, 1781, provided
that the Court was to "have appellate jurisdiction" rather than "be appellate."
Id. at 484. In addition to this and the other floor amendment described in
the text, there were other language changes in the final draft. Id. at 563.
24. Id. at 483. The distinction between common law and civil law would
also seem to involve the different treatment of fact issues by the courts.
The reference to civil law in the Convention debates probably referred to
the procedure in admiralty and equity cases, the civil law origin of which
was then more openly recognized than it is now. See, for example, the re-
mark of Alexander Hamilton about "the civil-law mode of trial, which
prevails in our courts of admiralty, probate, and chancery." THE FED-
ERALIST, No. 81, at 531 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941) (Hamilton). On the civil
law origin of equity and admiralty procedure as reflected in Americanjurisprudence, see COCKE, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON AND CIVIL
LAW, AS EMBRACED IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33.
34, 41, 43, 119, 120 (1871). The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that "the
trial of issues of fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury." 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
[Vol. 47:53
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swered Morris and stated that the Committee "meant facts as
well as law and Common as well as Civil Law." Other mem-
bers of the Committee did not object and presumably agreed. A
motion to insert "both as to law and fact" was adopted without
discussion or dissent as if it were a declaratory action.28 At this
point the Convention rejected a motion that would have given
Congress full precedent authority to define appellate jurisdiction.'
The idea that the authorization of Congress arose from the
problem of reviewing fact issues is further supported by the na-
ture of another creation of the Committee of Detail-the provision
guaranteeing jury trial in criminal cases. This guarantee immedi-
ately followed the section on Supreme Court jurisdiction in the re-
port of the Committee."s Like the idea of authorizing Congress
to make exceptions and regulations to appellate jurisdiction, the
guarantee of jury trial in criminal cases was not proposed in any
material officially submitted to the Committee and hence was a
Committee creation. Both the fact that the Committee provision
did not carry the jury trial guarantee beyond criminal cases and
the fact that the Supreme Court was authorized to review fact is-
sues were criticized by the delegates at the Convention and in the
ratification debates, and the nature of the charges and the grounds
for the defense on the two matters had much in common. Both
provisions were attacked as not recognizing the traditional com-
mon law right to have facts determined by a jury, and both were
defended on the ground that diversity of practice among the states,
particularly in equity and maritime cases, made specific agreement
on a broader provision virtually impossible at the Convention. The
problem may have been accentuated by differences of opinion on
the nature of admiralty jurisdiction, but the Convention seems
to have been strangely hesitant to attempt a resolution of the dif-
ferences.29
The difficulties arising from the varying practices in the judicial
treatment of fact issues were mentioned a number of times dur-
25. 5 ELLIOT 483. Wilson also pointed out that the jurisdiction of "the
federal court of appeals had ...been so construed." Ibid.
26. The motion was by Dickinson of Delaware. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. The Committee reported on August 6, 1787. Id. at 381.
29. The Convention undertook to resolve a number of other difficult
problems, such as those referred to the Committee of Eleven on August 31,
1787. 5 ELLIOT 503, 506, 507, 510, 520. No attempt was made to agree
definitely upon the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The action of the Convention in this regard hardly suggests that they intend-
ed to grant Congress virtually full discretion over the Court's appellate
power. Rather, the Convention seems to have acted as if they were referring
to Congress a particular problem which the Committee of Detail had found
highly controversial and which the delegates wished to avoid.
1962]
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ing the closing days of the Convention in opposition to proposals
that the jury trial guarantee should be broadened. For example,
when a motion was put forth that jury trial be preserved as
usual in civil cases (meaning noncriminal cases), Gorham of Mass-
achusetts, who had been a member of the Committee of Detail,
pointed out that the nature of juries and the type of cases in which
jury trial was usual differed among the states; the proposal was
defeated.3" Similar objections were interposed, with equal success,
when suggestions were made for a committee to consider the jury
trial problem and when a bill of rights was proposed.3 Again,
in the debates on the ratification of the Constitution, delegates
referred to the conflicting practice among the states. 32 For ex-
ample, Richard Spaight of North Carolina, in answer to objec-
tions, asserted that "the trial by jury was not forgotten in the
Convention," but the delegates had found it "impossible to make
any one uniform regulation for all the states."33 He specifically
related the difficulty to equity and maritime cases:
There are a number of equity and maritime cases, in some of the
states, in which jury trials are not used. Had the Convention said that
all causes should be tried by a jury, equity and maritime cases would
have been included. It was therefore left to the legislature [Congress]
to say in what cases it should be used . . . 34
Thus, the difficulty with the jury trial guarantee centered upon the
different practices in equity and maritime cases, and in this con-
nection it is worthy of note that the subsequently adopted seventh
amendment applies only to common law actions.35
30. On September 12, 1787, Williamson (North Carolina) urged a jury
trial guarantee in civil cases, but Gorham (Massachusetts), who had been
a member of the Committee of Detail, responded that it is not possible to
"discriminate" equity cases from those in which juries are proper. On
September 15, 1787, a motion was made to add a clause to the third para-
graph of the judiciary article to provide that "a trial by jury shall be pre-
served as usual in civil cases." Gorham interposed that the nature of juries
differs among the states and what is "usual" would not be the same in all
the states. King (Massachusetts) made similar objections, and Gen. Pinckney
said that such a clause would be "pregnant with embarrassments." The
motion was disapproved without a record vote. 5 ELLIOT 538, 550.
31. Id. at 538.
32. George Washington, in a letter of April 28, 1788, to Lafayette, said
with respect to trial by jury that "it was only the difficulty of establishing a
mode which should not interfere with the fixed modes of any of the States,
that induced the convention to leave it, as a matter of future adjustment."
3 FARRAND 297-98.
33. 4 ELLIOT 139-44.
34. Id. at 144.
35. The seventh amendment also requires that the re-examination by
the federal courts of a fact tried by a jury be according to the rules of the
[Vol. 47:53
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The Federalist contains definite indications that the problem
encountered with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court involved
issues of fact, not issues of law, and that the controversy over ap-
pellate review was connected with the problem of jury trial, which
of course involved only fact issues. Alexander Hamilton, in dis-
cussing the provision on appellate jurisdiction, stated that "the
propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely called in
question in regard to matters of law; but the clamors have been
loud against it as applied to matters of fact.""6 He also ac-
knowledged that persons deriving their notions from the court of
New York have considered the provision on appellate jurisdiction
to be "an implied supersedure of the trial by jury, in favor of the
civil-law mode of trial, which prevails in our courts of admiralty,
probate, and chancery." Hamilton then points out that the term
"appellate" would not have the same meaning in New England
as it would in New York. The various difficulties are evident in his
explanation of the manner in which the Convention may have ar-
rived at the express inclusion of appellate jurisdiction relating to
fact issues:
The following train of ideas may well be imagined to have influ-
enced the convention, in relation to this particular provision. The ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (it may have been argued)
will extend to causes determinable in different modes, some in the
course of the COMMON LAW, others in the course of the CrvL LAw.
In the former, the revision of the law only will be, generally speaking,
-the proper province of the Supreme Court; in the latter, the reexami-
nation of the fact is agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which
prizecauses are an example, might be essential to the preservation of
the public peace.
37
This suggests that in common law areas, the Supreme Court would
consider issues of law and in other areas, such as those using
civil law procedures, the Court would review issues of fact. The
reference to prize causes is noteworthy because it is another indi-
cation that the disturbing factor in the Convention was the appellate
review of admiralty cases. Hamilton continues:
It is therefore necessary that the appellate jurisdiction should, in cer-
tain cases, extend in the broadest sense to matters of fact. It will not
answer to make an express exception of cases which shall have been
originally tried by a jury, because in the courts of some of the States
common law- This would seem to limit to some extent the appellate power
of the Supreme ,Court. In. any event, it is a further manifestation of the diffi-
culty p'r&sented by the diverse modes of procedures in the courts at the time.
* 36. THE FEDERALIST No.- 81, at 530 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941) (Hamilton).
37. Id. at 532.
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all causes are tried in this mode; and such an exception would preclude
the revision of matters of fact, as well where it might be proper, as
where it might be improper. To avoid all inconveniences, it will be
safest to declare generally, that the Supreme Court shall possess ap-
pellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, and that this jurisdiction
shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as the national leg-
islature may prescribe. This will enable the government to modify it
in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and
security.3s
Hamilton's explanation is consistent with the idea that the prob-
lem facing the Committee of Detail and the Convention was the
review of fact issues. He brings together as common or related
problems the diversity of practice on the trial of fact issues, the
extent to which the Supreme Court should review issues of fact,
and the granting of authority to Congress to make exceptions and
regulations. Likewise, he did not regard the congressional au-
thorization as permitting Congress to exercise virtually unlimited
control over the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. In his mind
the Supreme Court was to be independent of Congress, and he went
to some pains to convince his fellow New Yorkers of the need
for such independence even though the highest court of New York
was a part of the legislature. There would have been no need
for such argument if the Court was to be at the mercy of Congress
for its appellate jurisdiction. But Hamilton did not calm the fears
of the New Yorkers by saying that Congress could control the
Court through its power to make exceptions and regulations: rath-
er, he pointed out that an independent judiciary was the establish-
ed practice in a number of states, and he argued for the necessity
of a supreme independent judiciary in the constitutional plan pre-
sented. 9
Some further evidence that the Founding Fathers connected
the guarantee of jury trial and the scope of appellate review is
found in the seventh amendment, which provides, in part, that no
fact tried by a jury shall be re-examined by any court of the United
States other than according to the rules of the common law.
38. Id. at 532-33.
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 516 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941) (Hamilton):
If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial
power of a government being coextensive with its legislative, may be
ranked among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the
interpretation of the national laws decides the question. Thirteen in-
dependent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon
the same laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing but
contradiction and confusion can proceed.
It is noteworthy that the Convention agreed to establish the Supren'
Court on the day after it had rejected a proposal that Congress have power
to negative state laws.
[Vol. 47:53
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The fact that the grant of authority to Congress concerning the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court includes the power to
make regulations as well as exceptions does not disturb the idea
that the grant of authority was designed for the problem of how
far the Court should review issues of fact. "Regulations" suggest
that procedural methods and the choice of procedures (as be-
tween writ of error or appeal) may determine whether the appel-
late court will review merely issues of law or review issues of fact
as well.4" There is little likelihood that the Constitutional Con-
vention was thinking of regulations needed for efficient operation.
Such rules could come within the scope of implied or inherent
powers. When Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, it un-
dertook to control the Supreme Court's power to review issues
of fact by regulating the modes of procedure as much as by ex-
cluding types of cases.4 For controversial types of cases, the act
prescribed writ of error rather than appeal.'2
In general, the Judiciary Act of 1789 seems to have restricted
the Supreme Court's authority over fact questions to perhaps an
undesirable extent, and some modification was enacted in 1803.11
But the 1789 statute broadly and affirmatively recognized the Su-
preme Court's authority to review issues of law. Appeals were not
recognized in criminal cases, but that was the general English
practice at the time," and the specific authority to deal with
writs of habeas corpus permitted consideration of at least the more
important questions of law arising in criminal proceedings.'
Thus, the congressional action in 1789 does not refute the idea
that the Convention merely intended that Congress was to settle
the dispute over the review of fact issues, and it may even support
such an interpretation.
II. ATTITUDES OF THE DELEGATES
The foregoing discussion indicates that the meetings of the
Committee of Detail between July 26 and August 6, 1787, were
the turning point in the Convention's decision to grant Congress
certain authority over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
40. See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796), discussed
in text accompanying note 59 infra.
41. Ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84 (1789).
42. See Warren, History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HIv.
L. Rxv. 49, 74-75, 102-03 (1923).
43. Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244 (1803). See 12 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 263, 265 (1803); United States v. Nourse, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
470, 496 (1832).
44. Ratner, supra note 4, at 195.
45. Id. at 196-201.
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Court. Prior to that time there was no proposal of congressional
authorization nor any recorded mention of appellate review of fact
issues. Until then, the delegates, with perhaps little specific re-
flection on the matter, seem to have thought of a Supreme Court
as dealing only with the determination of issues of law.4"
In the Eighteenth Century appellate review was less concerned
with fact issues than it is now. Among common law jurisdictions,
appeals of fact questions were probably limited to equity cases
in such states as had courts of Chancery,4 7 but such appeals ex-
isted in the federal courts in admiralty cases under acts of the
Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation.4" This is
particularly relevant because of the various references by delegates
to maritime cases and because one member of the Committee of
Detail, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, had strong feelings about
admiralty jurisdiction and the review of fact issues in such cases.
What he did and said in the meetings of the Committee of Detail,
if known, would probably be the best clues to why the Convention
extended certain discretionary authority to Congress over the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 9 There is little record
of what occurred within the Committee, but Wilson's statements
and actions elsewhere clearly indicate that he was very anxious
to have appellate review by the national judiciary of fact issues in
admiralty cases. There seems to be a definite possibility that Wil-
son, in seeking recognition of this power in the Supreme Court,
opened the whole question of how far fact issues could be review-
ed. Because a broad scope of review threatened to undermine the
value of jury trial, these problems may have become too complex
or too controversial for either the Committee or the Convention to
resolve.
Wilson's interest in admiralty cases and the national judiciary
extended over most of the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century.
In 1775 he was appointed to the committee established by the
Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation to make
final determinations in capture cases,50 and he was a member of
46. There was very little discussion of the Court's jurisdiction prior to
the meeting of the Committee of Detail. No plan submitted to the Conven-
tion nor resolution adopted by it had mentioned the review of fact issues.
47. One of the principal constitutional amendments proposed during the
ratification debates would have confined appellate power to questions of
law. See Warren, supra note 42, at 56.
48. Warren, supra note 42, at 74.
49. Wilson seems to have been an active member of the Committee of
Detail. The documents set forth in 2 FARRAND 129-75 under the heading
"Committee of Detail" consist almost entirely of papers from the Wilson
collection. One draft of the Constitution includes the provision on appellate
jurisdiction as it emerged from the Committee of Detail. Id. at 173.
50. 1 JOURNALS OF CONG. 177 (Way & Gideon ed. 1823).
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that group until 1777. In the following year he had an even closer
experience regarding appellate review of capture cases. This in-
volved a controversy in which he served as appeal attorney for
General Benedict Arnold, then military governor of Philadelphia.
Arnold had purchased the claim of one Gideon Olmstead to prize
money from the capture of the British sloop Active. Olmstead, along
with a number of other American sailors, had been captured and
placed aboard the British vessel. He then led an attempt to seize
the ship and was meeting with some success when an Ameri-
can brig, the Convention, under commission from the State of
Pennsylvania, captured the British ship. At the time, the privateer
Gerard was standing by. The prize money was claimed by all par-
ticipants and, at a trial by jury in the Pennsylvania admiralty
court, the prize money was awarded four ways: one fourth to the
State of Pennsylvania, another to the crew of the Convention,
another to the Gerard, and the last to Olmstead and his colleagues,
although they seem to have taken the greatest risks." Wilson
took the matter to the Congressional Court of Appeals, which
awarded his client a larger judgment. However, the Pennsylvania
court refused to accept the larger award on the ground that a
state law prohibited appeals to a higher court on the findings of
fact by a jury.5" This experience may have given Wilson a special
reason for wanting the Constitution to recognize the power of the
national judiciary to review admiralty cases as to both fact and
law.
The records of the Convention disclose that Wilson had a con-
tinuing interest in this matter. Within a week after the session be-
gan, he asserted that "the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given
wholly to the national government, as it related to cases not within
the jurisdiction of particular states, and to a scene in which con-
troversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen."'
Later, when the provision reported by the Committee of Detail
was being discussed and Gouverneur Morris inquired of the scope
of the appellate jurisdiction, it was Wilson who answered that the
Committee- intended the authority to include questions of fact.
Other members of the Committee seemed to avoid further consid-
eration of the review of fact issue and the jury trial question, and
when the latter problem was brought up, one member, Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts, argued that it was too difficult to be
considered.' In the debates of the Convention on ratification,
51. SMrrE, JAMES -WILsON 124 (1956).
:52. Id. at 125-27."
53. 5 ELLIOT 159; cf. VWiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 324
(1796).
54. See note 30 supra.
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Wilson defended the provisions on appellate review and jury trial
more positively and more specifically than any other member of
the Committee of Detail. In his speech before the Pennsylvania
House of Delegates, he tended to regard the two provisions as re-
lated.5 As to jury trial he asserted that there was ample protec-
tion in the authority of the legislature to determine the mode of
trial.5" On appellate jurisdiction he was even more definite:
The jurisdiction as to fact may be thought improper; but those pos-
sessed of information on this head see that it is necessary. We find it
essentially necessary from the ample experience we have had in the
courts of admiralty with regard to captures.57
The matter of admiralty cases was uppermost in his mind, and
he called attention to cases in which vessels had been captured
during the Revolutionary War, remarking "what a poor chance"
owners had before juries and "in what a situation they would
have been if the Court of Appeals had not been possessed of au-
thority to reconsider and set aside the verdicts of those juries."" s
Thus, his intense interest in the review of admiralty cases seems
to be a continuing preoccupation. The records disclose that two
months before the Committee of Detail met, Wilson had advocated
that the admiralty jurisdiction be exclusively national and that five
months after the Committee reported, he defended appellate re-
view of fact issues in his speech before the Pennsylvania Ilouse of
Delegates. Most likely, it was Wilson who raised the problem
which led the Committee and the Convention to authorize Con-
gress to make exceptions and regulations of the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court.
It is equally interesting that James Wilson was also the catalyst
in the formation of the Supreme Court's position that appellate
jurisdiction is dependent upon congressional action. In Wiscart v.
Dauchy,59 when Wilson was a Justice of the Supreme Court and
his one time associate on the Committee of Detail, Oliver Ells-
worth, was the Chief Justice, the Court first asserted its depend-
ence upon Congress for appellate jurisdiction. The Wiscart case
was an equity proceeding in which the circuit court held that the
execution of certain deeds had been fraudulent because they pre-
55. 3 FARRAND 167-68.
56. 2 ELLIOT 488 (2d ed. 1876).
57. Id. at 493.
58. Ibid. Wilson also said that attempts were made in some states
to destroy this power of review, but that the power was confirmed in every
instance. He noted that there were other cases in which review will be
necessary but did not identify the types. Id. at 493-94.
59. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
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vented the complainant-creditor from obtaining satisfaction of his
claim. The appeal before the Supreme Court turned principally
on whether the circuit court had sufficiently stated the facts on
which it decided the case in the pleadings and the decree, and
the Court held that the facts were adequately set forth. In the
opinion of the Court, Ellsworth said that where equity or ad-
miralty cases are removed to the Court with a statement of facts
but without evidence, the statement is conclusive. On this the
Court was unanimous. But only the majority asserted that the
statement of facts is conclusive even when the evidence is brought
forward; Wilson and Patterson dissented.'
Ellsworth's mention of admiralty cases apparently stirred Wilson
into action because he presented a separate opinion that dealt
mainly with the question of Supreme Court review of fact issues
in admiralty cases. Although this seems to have been outside the
scope of the case, Wilson explained that admiralty jurisdiction was
important because it affected the rights of foreigners, a point he
had also made before the Constitutional Convention in 1787.6"
His most pertinent contention in the Wiscart opinion was that an
appeal (which would permit review of fact issues) was the proper
mode of removing an admiralty case. He also argued that a denial
of such review in admiralty cases would be unconstitutional. More-
over, he interpreted the Judiciary Act of 1789 as excluding ad-
miralty cases from the general provision that civil cases were to
be removed by writ of error; admiralty cases were not intended to
come within the category of civil cases, and since Congress had
thus not dealt with such cases, the Court had jurisdiction by virtue
of its constitutional powers.62
Wilson's contentions caused Ellsworth to enter a rebuttal opin-
ion-the practice being to have seriatim opinions by the Justices
in the nature of a dialogue-and it is in this second, rebuttal opin-
ion that Ellsworth made the famous assertion that "if Congress
has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot ex-
ercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we
cannot depart from it."' The first part of this statement is his-
torically the more important, but it was unnecessary because Ells-
worth maintained, that Congress had prescribed the mode of re-
view.- Ellsworth's statement would probably not have been
60. That Patterson was the fellow dissenter is indicated in Jennings v.
The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797), which held that the
review of admiralty cases does not extend to fact questions.
61. 3 U.S. at 324.
62. Id. at 325-27.
63. Id. at 327.
64. Ratner, supra note 4, at 174.
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made if Wilson had not been so determined to plead again the
cause which had disturbed him since his experience in the Olm-
stead case 18 years before-the power of the national judiciary to
review the facts in admiralty cases as well as the law. Because
Wilson went out of his way to maintain that the Supreme Court
had such power, Ellsworth went out of his way to say that the
Court lacked it. They were both a bit afield, perhaps continuing
arguments begun in the Committee of Detail ten years earlier. But
what Ellsworth said at the time of the Wiscart case has been vir-
tually gospel for the Supreme Court from that year to this. Thus,
both the constitutional provision empowering Congress to make
exceptions and regulations with respect to the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court and the broad interpretation that the
Court has given to this provision seem to have originated because
of Wilson's determined efforts to establish review of fact issues in
admiralty cases.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional grant of authority to Congress over the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court appears to have origi-
nated because of a particularly limited problem-the extent to
which the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction to review fact
issues in those cases in which practice differed among the states.
There is a definite possibility that the grant of authority to Con-
gress was devised in the Committee of Detail of the Constitutional
Convention in order to avoid further controversy when James
Wilson of Pennsylvania insisted that the Constitution recognize the
power of the national judiciary to review fact issues in admiralty
cases. Later, when the controversy was reopened and the issue
was re-argued by Ellsworth and Wilson in the Wiscart opinions,
the Supreme Court was started on a long path of overstatement of
Congress' power.
What actually happened in the Committee of Detail may al-
ways remain largely unverified, but there is considerable evidence
that delegates to the Convention associated the grant of power to
Congress with the divergent practice among the states on the
review of fact questions. If the intent of the Constitutional Con-
vention is deemed to be controlling, then there would seem to be
substantial grounds for saying that the authority of Congress
to make exceptions and regulations with respect to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to the treatment of fact
issues. The effect of such a limited interpretation would be prin-
cipally to exclude power that Congress has not exercised. As in-
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dicated previously, the restrictions that Congress has imposed upon
the review of issues of law have been no more than those that
seem necessary for the efficient operation of the Court. Such re-
strictions can be made either by Congress, under a limited implied
power to provide for the operation of the Court, or by the Court
itself, under an inherent power to maintain its existence in an ef-
ficient manner.
Nevertheless, there would be substantial benefits resulting from
recognition of the principle that the power of Congress over the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to the treat-
ment of fact issues. This principle would tend to reconcile the
action of the Constitutional Convention in granting this power to
Congress with the Convention's general purpose of establishing a
substantially independent national judiciary. On this assumption,
the comparatively little attention which the delegates gave to
this provision is better understood. This interpretation of the power
to make exceptions and regulations would tend to calm any fears
that might arise from the prospect that the dicta in Supreme
Court opinions would actually be applied if Congress would at-
tempt to deny the Court any of its important authority.
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